f .  S  .11" 


UNi  /  V. 

IE 


INTERSTATE  COMMERCE 


COMMISSION. 


IN  RE  INVESTIGATION  OF  AN  ACCIj?ENT  WHICH  OCCURRED  ON 
THE  BALTIMORE  &  OHIO  RAILROAD,   NEAR  IRVING,  W.  VA., 

MAY  22,  1917. 

July  G,  1917. 

To  the  Com/mission: 

On  May  22.  1917.  at  about  12.03  p.  m.,  there  was  a  head-end 
collision  between  a  freight  train  and  a  wrecking  train,  near  Irving, 
between  Wallace  and  Dola,  W.  Va.,  on  the  "West  Virginia  Short  Lino 
subdivision,  Monongah  division,  of  the  Baltimore  &  Ohio  Railroad. 
resulting  in  the  death  of  one  employee  and  the  injury  of  four 
employees. 

As  a  result  of  the  investigation  as  to  the  cause  and  nature  of  this 
accident,  I  beg  to  submit  the  following  report: 

That  part  of  the  West  Virginia  Short  Line  subdivision  extending 
from  Lumberport  to  Hartzel,  W.  Va.,  is  a  single-track  line  running 
approximately  east  and  west;  on  account  of  certain  operating  condi- 
tions, the  direction  of  train  operation  as  shown  by  the  time-table  is 
just  the  reverse  of  geographical  directions,  trains  operated  from 
Hartzel  toward  Lumberport  being  considered  westward  trains,  and 
trains  operated  in  the  opposite  direction  being  considered  eastward 
trains.  In  this  report  all  reference  to  directions  is  made  in  accord- 
ance with  the  directions  used  by  the  railroad  company  for  the  opera- 
tion of  its  trains.  Over  this  line  trains  are  operated  by  the  telephone 
dispatching  system,  and  in  addition  an  absolute  block  at  open  tele- 
phone stations  is  maintained  behind  passenger  trains. 

There  are  two  daily  scheduled  passenger  trains  in  each  direction 
over  this  line,  and  six  scheduled  freight  trains  in  each  direction,  the 
average  train  movement  over  the  line  being  10  or  12  trains  in  each 
direction  each  day.  Hartzel  and  Lumberport,  14  miles  apart,  are 
telephone  offices,  open  day  and  night,  the  dispatcher  being  located 
at  Lumberport;  there  are  two  intermediate  day  offices,  Rinehart.  1.5 
miles  from  Hartzel,  and  Dola,  8.2  miles  from  Hartzel.  Telephone 
booths  are  provided  at  other  passing  sidings,  at  which  train  crews 
may  communicate  with  the  dispatcher  for  the  purpose  of  securing 
orders.  Irving  is  located  3.3  miles  from  Rinehart,  and  3.4  miles  from 
Dola :  at  Irving  there  is  a  water  tank,  a  passing  siding  and  a  tele- 
phone booth. 

In  this  vicinity  the  grade  is  slightly  ascending  for  eastward  trains, 
being  0.184  per  cent  from  a  point  west  of  the  scene  of  the  accident  to 
a  point  east  of  the  water  tank  at  Irving.  The  track  in  this  vicinity  is 
very  crooked:  approaching  Irving  from  Brown,  a  station  a  mile  to 
the  west,  there  is  a  curve  of  8  degrees  50  minutes  toward  the  right. 

1900—17 


2  INTERSTATE    COMMERCE   COMMISSION. 

followed  by  a  tangent  739  feet  in  length ;  then  there  is  a  7-degree 
curve  to  the  left  579  feet  long,  the  point  of  collision  being  at  approxi- 
mately the  middle  of  this  7-degree  curve.  Proceeding  farther  ea-t- 
ward,  the  track  curves  toward  the  left  nearly  as  far  as  the  water  tank 
at  Irving,  there  being  a  30-minute  curve  735  feet  in  length,  and  a 
2-degree  30-minute  curve  895  feet  in  length.  The  collision  occured  in 
a  side-hill  cut,  the  hill  being  on  the  inside  of  the  curve.  From  the 
approaching  trains  the  view  of  the  track  at  the  scene  of  the  accident 
was  restricted  to  a  distance  of  approximately  400  feet.  At  the  point 
of  accident  the  track  was  laid  with  100-pound  rails,  33  feet  long, 
with  about  18  oak  or  treated  ties  per  rail,  tie-plated  and  single- 
spiked,  with  about  12  inches  of  granulated  slag  and  cinder  ballast 
below  the  bottom  of  the  ties.  At  the  time  of  the  collision  the  weather 
was  clear. 

The  trains  involved  in  this  collision  wore  a  wrecking  train,  extra 
2030,  with  Conductor  Wells.  Engineman  Kinkaid,  and  Pilot  Hamil- 
ton in  charge,  and  westward  second-class  freight  train  No.  99,  with 
Conductor  Greathouse  and  Engineman  Holt  in  charge. 

During  the  night  of  May  21,  the  Benwood  wreck  train  was  called 
to  clear  up  a  derailment,  due  to  a  pulled-out  drawbar,  about  half- 
way between  Irving  and  Dola  near  bridge  118.  As  the  crew  in 
charge  of  this  train  was  a  Wheeling  division  crew  and  not  familiar 
with  the  track  west  of  XTartzel,  no  Monongah  division  crew  being 
available  at  Hartzel,  Engineman  Hamilton,  a  Wheeling  division 
man  who  was  familiar  with  the  road  in  this  vicinity,  was  assigned  to 
pilot  the  train:  it  left  Hartzel  at  5.30  a.  m.,  and  at  Irving  Flagman 
Harbison  was  left  with  written  instructions  from  Conductor  Wells 
to  "  hold  all  trains  until  extra  2030  arrives.'' 

Extra.  2030  proceeded  to  the  scene  of  derailment  under  ru  ining 
orders  to  that  point,  cleared  the  wreckage  from  the  track,  reported 
the  track  clear  shortly  after  9  o'clock,  and  proceeded  to  Dola  with- 
out running  orders,  protected  only  by  an  order  received  from  the 
dispatcher  by  telephone  directing  all  eastbound  trains  to  wait  at 
Dola  until  10  o'clock:  the  wreck  train  took  siding  at  that  point  to 
allow  westbound  passenger  train  Xo.  37  to  pass. 

After  getting  into  clear  at  Dola,  Conductor  AVells  of  extra  2030 
sent  a  message  to  Flagman  Harbison  at  Irving,  in  care  of  the  engine- 
man  of  train  No.  37,  directing  him  to  come  to  Dola  on  train  Xo.  37. 
In  the  meantime,  also,  Flagman  Harbison,  listening  on  the  phone  at 
Irving,  had  learned  that  the  main  track  was  reported  clear  anil  that 
his  conductor  wanted  him  to  go  to  Dola  on  Xo.  37.  lie  flagged 
train  Xo.  37,  informed  the  engineman  what  his  flagging  instructions 
were,  and  was  then  advised  by  the  engineman  that  he  held  a  mes- 
sage directing  him  to  go  to  Dola  on  train  Xo.  37.  Flagman  Harbison 
proceeded  to  Dola  as  instructed  by  his  conductor,  train  No.  37  arriv- 
ing at  that  point  at  11. 3G  a.  m. 


ACCIDENT     NEAR    [RVING,    VV.    VA.  3 

Up  to  this  point  the  statements  of  all  employees  involved  agree  in 
all  essential  particulars,  but  from  this  point  on  the  account  of  what 
actually  occurred  leading  up  to  the  collision  between  extra  2030  and 
train  Xo.  99  is  clouded  and  obscured  by  conflicting  statements  and 
evidence. 

The  dispatcher's  train  sheet  indicates  that  train  No.  37  left  Dola 
at  11.37,  while  the  operator's  block  record  indicates  that  it  did  not 
leave  until  11.40. 

Conductor  Wells  states  that  before  the  arrival  of  train  No.  -'17  at 
Dola  he  had  decided  to  send  his  flagman  back  to  Irving  on  a  light 
engine.  Xo.  1814,  which  was  then  in  the  siding  at  Dola  waiting  for 
Xo.  37,  and  he  had  written  out  a  second  set  of  instructions  for  Flag- 
man Harbison  directing  him  to  flag  all  trains  and  notify  them  to 
look  out  for  engine  2030  handling  wreck  train  a  short  distance  cast 
of  bridge  418.  When  No.  37  arrived  he  assisted  the  operator  in  load 
ing  some  heavy  express,  and  then  after  37  had  departed  he  went  over 
to  the  wreck  train,  standing  on  the  siding,  found  the  flagman  in  the 
bunk  car  preparing  to  wash  for  dinner,  told  him  he  would  not  have 
time  to  eat  then,  directed  him  to  ride  engine  1814  back  to  Irving,  and 
gave  him  the  second  set  of  written  instructions.  He  stated  that  he 
then  went  back  to  the  office  and  received  instructions  from  the  dis- 
patcher through  the  operator  to  flag  to  Irving,  allow  train  Xo.  00 
and  the  train  involved  in  the  derailment,  of  which  engine  1814  was  a 
part,  to  proceed,  and  then  return  to  the  scene  of  the  derailment  for 
the  purpose  of  completing  the  work  of  picking  up  the  derailed  cars. 
He  stated  he  then  wrote  a  third  order  to  the  flagman,  directing  him 
to  go  to  Irving  and  hold  all  trains  until  extra  2030  arrived  there. 
He  wrote  these  instructions  at  the  telephone  booth  just  outside  the 
office,  went  across  the  track  and  met  Flagman  Harbison  on  the  ground' 
just  a.  Jie  got  off  from  the  rear  end  of  the  wreck  train,  gave  him  these 
instructions  and  told  him  what  they  were,  although  neither  one  of 
them  read  these  third  instructions  aloud.  Conductor  Wells  stated  the 
flagman  took  the  third  instructions,  climbed  on  engine  1814.  and  that 
engine  then  departed. 

Flagman  Harbison  stated  that  upon  his  arrival  at  Dola  he  got  off 
the  train  on  the  side  toAvard  the  wreck  train  and  opposite  from  the 
station,  went  into  one  of  the  wreck-train  cars  and  then  went  down  to 
engine  2030  to  call  the  engine  crew  to  dinner.  This  was  just  as  train 
37  was  pulling  out  and  he  rode  clown  on  the  steps  of  one  of  the  cars. 
He  returned  to  the  bunk  car  and  had  just  washed  or  was  preparing 
to  wash  when  the  conductor  came  in  and  told  him  that  he  would 
not  have  time  to  eat  then,  but  would  have  to  go  back  to  Irving  to 
flag,  noticing  all  trains  to  look  out  for  extra  2030- just  east  of  bridge 
418;  Conductor  Wells  also  handed  him  the  second  written  instruc- 
tions, which  were  to  that  effect.  Flagman  Harbison  stated  he  then 
picked  up  his  coat  and  flag,  went  through  the  dining  car  and  got  a 


4  INTERSTATE   COMMERCE   COMMISSION. 

sandwich,  got  off  at  the  rear  end  of  the  wreck  train,  climbed  on 
engine  1814,  and  departed  without  seeing  Conductor  Wells  again  or 
receiving  any  further  instructions  from  him.  He  positively  denied 
receiving  the  third  written  instructions  which  Conductor  Wells 
claims  were  given  him. 

No  one  eke  was  present  in  the  bunk  ear  when  the  second  written 
instructions  were  given  to  Flagman  Harbison  by  Conductor  Wells, 
and  no  one  overheard  any  later  conversation  between  them  or  saw 
them  talking  together  after  Flagman  Harbison  left  the  wreck  train 
to  get  onto  the  light  engine.  Conductor  Willis,  of  the  light  engine, 
was  at  that  time  facing  the  station  sitting  on  the  tender  of  engine 
1814,  headed  west,  and  he  stated  he  saw  Flagman  Harbison  on  the 
ground  opposite  the  rear  of  the  wreck  train  coming  toward  the  light 
engine,  but  Conductor  Wells  was  not  with  him  or  anywhere  in  sight 
at  that  time. 

For  the  greater  part  of  the  time  while  the  wrecking  train  was  at 
Dola.  Engineman  Kinkaid  and  Pilot  Hamilton  were  sitting  on  some 
rolls  of  wire  on  the  station  platform  near  the  telephone  booth,  and 
they  overheard  part  of  the  conversation  between  Conductor  Wells, 
Operator  Morris,  and  the  dispatcher.  Pilot  Hamilton  stated  that 
when  the  second  instructions  to  the  flagman  were  being  written  out 
Conductor  Wells  asked  him  the  number  of  the  bridge  near  which 
the  derailment  occurred,  and  both  the  pilot  and  engineman  stated 
that  although  they  did  not  read  these  second  instructions  they  knew 
what  they  were.  These  instructions  were  prepared  before  the  arrival 
of  train  No.  37.  Later,  after  further  conversation  with  either  the 
operator  or  the  dispatcher,  the  conductor  said  that  the  wreck  train 
would  follow  the  light  engine  to  Irving,  release  the  freight  trains 
there,  and  then  return  to  the  point  of  derailment,  and  the  third  set 
of  instructions  for  the  flagman  were  prepared.  Neither  the  engine- 
man  nor  the  pilot  read  these  third  instructions,  but  both  stated  they 
saw  Conductor  Wells  walk  across  the  track,  enter  one  of  the  wreck- 
train  cars,  and  a  moment  later  the  flagman  came  out.  Pilot  Ham- 
ilton said  that  twice  afterwards  he  asked  Conductor  Wells  what 
instructions  Flagman  Harbison  held,  and  both  times  he  was  tolcl  that 
Flagman  Harbison  had  been  instructed  to  hold  everything  until 
extra  2030  arrived  at  Irving.     Engineman  Kinkaid  corroborated  this. 

One  of  the  members  of  the  wrecking  crew  stated  that  Flagman 
Harbison  came  into  the  dining  car  and  got  a  sandwich — several  of 
them  saw  him  get  the  sandwich — and  he  then  passed  through  the  car, 
followed  by  the  conductor,  who  made  some  remark  about  going  to 
Irving  to  flag;  the  flagman  passed  out  the  rear  end  of  the  car,  and 
that  was  the  last  he  saw  of  him.  He  did  not  remember  just  what 
was  said  about  flagging,  but  was  sure  the  conductor  followed  the 
flagman  through  the  car. 


\i  (  ■Ii>h.\'l      XKAi:    1I!V!X<;,    W.    VA.  5 

Operator  Morris,  who  was  on  duty  at  Dola,  stated  that  he  was 
instructed  by  the  dispatcher  to  direct  Conductor  Wells  to  place  a 
flagman  on  engine  1814,  go  to  Irving  and  release  train  99,  then  conie 
back  to  the  scene  of  the  derailment  and  complete  his  work.  Dis- 
patcher Kellev  denied  that  he  gave  any  such  instinct  ions,  but  stated 
that  the  operator  informed  him  Conductor  Wells  was  going  to  send 
a  flagman  to  Irving  on  engine  1814;  he  said,  '"All  right,  but  tell  him 
not  to  delay  No.  99,"  or  words  to  that  effect.  When  questioned  during 
the  investigation,  Dispatcher  Kelley  stated  he  could  have  held  the 
wreck  train  at  Dola  for  train  No.  99  if  he  had  considered  it  neces- 
sary 0]  desirable  to  do  so.  But  engine  1814  had  a  meet  order  with 
No.  99  at  Irving,  and  he  thought  that  by  following  that  engine  under 
the  protection  of  a  flag  the  wreck  train  might  save  some  time  in  get- 
ting back  to  work  at  the  scene  of  the  derailment. 

The  light  engine  departed  from  Dola  at  11.42  a.  in.  and  upon  ar- 
rival at  Irving  Flagman  Harbison  climbed  on  engine  2559  of  train  No. 
99  at  the  water  tank;  he  told  Engineman  Holt  that  his  instructions 
were  to  flag  all  trains  and  tell  them  to  look  out  for  engine  2030 
handling  wreck  train  a  short  distance  east  of  bridge  418.  Train 
No.  99,  consisting  of  locomotive.  27  cars,  and  caboose,  then  proceeded 
approximately  half  a  mile  to  the  point  where  the  collision  occurred. 
Engineman  Holt  stated  that  his  train  was  running  approximately 
15  miles  per  hour  when  he  first  saw  the  wreck  train;  he  immediately 
applied  the  brakes  in  emergency,  and  his  train  had  nearly  stopped 
when  the  collision  occurred.  The  point  where  the  wreck  train  was 
supposed  to  be  working  was  approximately  a  mile  and  a  half  farther 
Avest. 

After  the  light  engine  left  Dola,  the  wreck  train  set  out  a  car. 
and  then  followed  the  light  engine  toward  Irving,  holding  neither 
running  nor  work  orders.  The  train  consisted  of  a  dining  car,  bunk 
car,  tool  car,  flat  car,  locomotive  2030  headed  west,  two  flat  cars. 
and  a  crane  car,  in  the  order  named.  Conductor  Wells  was  riding  on 
the  front  platform  of  the  dining  car  in  the  direction  in  which  the 
train  was  moving.  He  heard  train  No.  99  whistle  and  almost  at  the 
same  time  saw  the  front  end  of  the  engine.  He  stated  that  he 
reached  down  and  opened  the  angle  cock  on  the  head  end,  and  then 
jumped  off  just  before  the  collision  occurred.  Engineman  Kinkaid 
stated  that  he  saw  train  No.  99  just  before  the  collision  occurred  and 
applied  the  brakes  in  emergency.  The  speed  of  the  wreck  train 
was  variously  estimated  at  from  8  to  15  miles  per  hour. 

In  the  collision  the  cook  of  the  wrecking  outfit  was  killed,  two 
employees  were  seriously  injured,  and  two  slightly  injured.  The 
dining  and  bunk  cars  were  telescoped  for  almost  their  entire  length 
and  were  entirely  destroyed.  Both  cars  were  of  wooden  construction 
and  the  wreckage  caught  fire,  but  the  fire  was  soon  put  out.  The 
truck  and  front  drivers  of  engine  No.  2559  were  derailed,  the  pilot 
beam  was  broken  and  the  front  end  was  bent  in.     There  was  onlv 


6  INTERSTATE   COMMERCE   COMMISSION. 

slight  damage  to  the  track.  The  track  at  this  point  was  cleared  by 
the  wrecking  outfit  involved  in  the  collision. 

This  accident  was  caused  by  conductor,  engineman,  and  pilot  of 
the  wreck  train  attempting  to  move  their  train  from  Dola  to  Irving 
without  orders  and  without  proper  flag  or  other  protection,  result- 
ing in  train  Xo.  99  leaving  Irving  before  the  wreck  train  arrived. 

The  investigation  disclosed  that  there  was  no  necessity  for  the 
wreck  train  to  go  to  Irving  to  release  train  Xo.  99.  That  train  was 
free  to  leave  Irving  as  soon  as  engine  1814  reached  that  point  and 
the  meet  order  was  fulfilled,  and  had  the  wreck  train  remained  on 
the  siding  at  Dola  for  train  Xo.  99,  all  possibility  of  the  collision 
would  have  been  averted.  According  to  Dispatcher  Kelley's  state- 
ment, the  move  to  Irving  was  made  by  Conductor  Wells  upon  his 
own  initiative,  and  the  dispatcher  assumed  it  was  being  done  to  save 
time:  however.  Operator  Morris  understood  that  the  dispatcher  di- 
rected that  movement  to  be  made,  and  he  so  informed  Conductor 
Wells.  In  any  event,  it  is  believed  that  the  dispatcher  exercised  poor 
judgment,  according  to  his  own  statement,  in  acquiescing  in  such  a 
movement;  and  Conductor  Wells  should  have  arranged  with  the  dis- 
patcher to  remain  on  the  siding  at  Dola  when,  according  to  his  own 
and  the  operator's  statements,  he  was  directed  by  the  dispatcher  to 
go  to  Irving  to  release  Xo.  99. 

In  view  of  the  fact  that  for  a  period  of  more  than  two  hours  the 
wreck  train  lay  on  the  siding  at  Dola,  an  open  office  where  an  opera- 
tor was  stationed,  there  was  ample  time  and  opportunity  for  the  crew 
to  arrange  with  the  dispatcher  for  the  proper  movement  of  their 
train.  Conductor  Wells  stated  that  it  was  his  purpose  upon  arrival 
at  Irving  to  communicate  with  the  dispatcher  by  telephone  from  the 
booth  located  at  that  point  and  secure  work  orders  to  permit  him  to 
complete  the  work  of  picking  up  derailed  cars.  But  it  can  not  be 
considered  good  railroad  practice — in  fact,  it  is  an  extremely  hazard- 
ous practice — for  a  train  to  leave  an  open  office,  where  an  operator  is 
on  duty,  without  orders,  under  flag  protection,  with  the  express  inten- 
tion of  going  to  a  siding  where  no  operator  is  located  and  there  ask 
for  work  orders  direct  from  the  dispatcher.  There  was  no  reason  in 
this  case  why  orders  should  not  have  been  asked  for  and  received  at 
Dola.  Had  the  movement  been  handled  in  that  manner,  if  there  was 
not  sufficient  time  to  establish  a  meeting  point  at  Irving,  the  wreck 
train  would  undoubted])}7  have  been  held  at  Dola  for  train  Xo.  !>!>, 
and  the  collision  would  thereby  have  been  averted. 

According  to  the  statement  of  Conductor  Wells,  he  gave  Flagman 
Harbison  three  different  written  flagging  orders  or  instructions  during 
the  course  of  the  forenoon;  none  of  them  were  read  aloud  by  flagman 
or  conductor,  and  when  new  instructions  were  issued  the  former  ones 
Were  neither  taken  away  from  the  flagman  nor  destroyed.  While  the 
flagman  carried  out  the  lust  instructions  which  he  received,  accord- 


A«  (  [DENT    NEAB    II1VIXG,    W.    VA.  i 

ing  to  his  statement,  the  misunderstanding  and  the  collision  might 
have  been  averted  if  the  flagging  instructions  when  issued  had  been 
read  aloud  and  the  instructions  which  were  superseded  taken  up. 

The  flagman  stated  positively  that  he  received  only  two  sets  of  writ- 
ten instructions;  these  he  still  had  in  his  possession  at  the  time  of  the 
investigation.  1  Ie  displayed  them  and  they  were  identified  by  Conduc- 
tor Wells  as  the  first  and  second  instructions  issued.  Flagman  Harbi- 
son denied  absolutely  that  he  received  the  third  instructions,  and 
elated  that  he  had  no  knowledge  or  intimation  whatever  that  extra 
2030  was  going  to  follow  engine  1814  to  Irving.  If  his  statement  is 
correct.  Flagman  Harbison  properly  performed  his  flagging  duties 
under  the  instructions  held  by  him,  and  no  criticism  attaches  to  him. 
On  the  other  hand,  however,  if  he  did  receive  the  third  instruction-. 
as  claimed  by  Conductor  Wells,  Flagman  Harbison  failed  to  carry 
out  those  instructions  and  failed  to  protect  his  train  as  directed. 

Conductor  Wells  is  equally  positive  that  the  third  instructions, 
namely,  to  hold  all  trains  at  Irving,  were  given  to  the  flagman: 
however,  if  his  statement  in  this  respect  is  not  correct  Conductor 
Wells  himself  failed  to  provide  proper  flag  protection  for  the  in- 
tended movement  of  the  wrecking  train. 

There  is  a  discrepancy  of  three  minutes  in  the  record  of  the  de- 
parture of  train  Xo.  37  from  Dola,  the  dispatcher's  train  sheet  show- 
ing the  time  of  departure  at  11.37  and  the  operator's  block  sheet 
showing  11.40;  neither  the  dispatcher  nor  the  operator  was  able  to 
explain  or  in  any  way  reconcile  this  difference.  Engine  1814  de- 
parted at  11.42;  therefore,  on  the  basis  of  the  dispatcher's  record, 
there  was  an  interval  of  five  minutes  between  the  departure  of  train 
37  and  engine  1814,  which  probably  would  have  been  sufficient  to 
enable  Conductor  Wells  to  communicate  with  the  dispatcher  and  is-ue 
the  third  set  of  flagging  instructions,  as  claimed  by  him;  but  the 
operator's  records  show  an  interval  of  only  two  minutes  between  the 
departure  of  train  37  and  engine '1814,  which  probably  would  not 
have  been  long  enough  to  permit  Conductor  Wells  to  do  all  that  he 
stated  was  done  during  that  time. 

Although  everyone  concerned,  or  everyone  who  might  have  any 
knowledge,  however  remotely,  was  interviewed,  it  was  not  possible 
to  verify  or  discredit  the  statements  of  either  flagman  or  conductor 
where  they  are  at  variance  in  their  essential  features.  There  appear- 
to  be  no  reasonable  explanation  of  failure  of  the  flagman  to  obey  the 
third  instructions  if  he  received  them,  or  of  failure  of  the  conductor 
to  provide  the  instructions  which  were  necessary  to  protect  the  in- 
tended movement  of  his  train.  The  matter  therefore  resolves  itself 
into  a  question  of  veracity  between  the  two  men.  concerning  which  no 
conclusion  can  be  drawn. 

In  any  event,  in  view  of  the  fact  that  the  proposed  movement  was 
to  be  made  without  orders,  both  Engineman  Kinkaid  and  Pilot  Hajn- 


UNIVERSITY  OF  FLORIDA 


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3  1262  08856  5345 


ilton,  particularly  the  hitter,  are  at  fault  far  their  failure  to  confer 
with  the  conductor,  as  well  as  to  see  the  written  instructions  given 
to  the  flagman  and  to  know  positively  what  instructions  he  held. 
Both  of  them  were  at  the  station  when  the  nagging  instructions  were 
prepared,  and  had  either  of  them  taken  any  active  interest  in  the 
matter  the  misunderstanding  would  undoubtedly  have  been  prevented 
and  the  wreck  averted. 

While  it  had  no  direct  bearing  upon  this  accident,  the  investigation 
disclosed  very  lax  methods  in  examining  and  instructing  men  when 
employed  on  the  Wheeling  division  of  the  Baltimore  &  Ohio  Rail- 
road. Men  were  employed  for  train  service  by  a  trainmaster's  clerk 
or  transportation  clerk  who  has  himself  never  been  examined  on 
the  book  of  rules ;  the  only  examination  given  was  very  perfunctory, 
consisting  merely  of  filling  in  answers  to  questions  contained  in  a 
printed  form;  these  answers  were  supposed  to  be  checked  over  by 
this  clerk  and  to  be  supplemented  by  such  explanations  or  instruc- 
tions as  he  might  give.  At  the  time  of  the  investigation  of  this 
accident  there  was  no  rules  examiner  continuously  employed  on  that 
division,  although  arrangements  were  at  that  time  being  made  for 
such  a  position;  on  the  Monongah  division  an  examiner  is  continu- 
ously employed. 

All  of  the  men  involved  in  this  accident  were  experienced  men ; 
none  of  them  had  been  on  duty  for  excessive  periods,  and  all  of  them 
had  had  proper  rest  periods  before  going  on  duty. 

Conductor  Wells  had  been  employed  by  the  Baltimore  &  Ohio 
Railroad  Co.  for  about  10  years,  5  years  as  a  brakeman  and  5  years 
as  a  conductor. 

Flagman  Harbison  had  had  several  years'  experience  on  this  line 
as  a  fireman ;  he  had  been  out  of  railroad  service  since  1910  and  had 
been  employed  as  a  brakeman  only  five  or  six  weeks  prior  to  the 
date  of  this  accident.  He  had  never  been  examined  on  the  book  of 
rules  at  present  in  effect  on  the  Baltimore  &  Ohio  Railroad. 

Engineman  Kinkaid  and  Pilot  Hamilton  entered  the  service  as 
firemen  in  1906  and  1907,  respectively,  and  both  were  promoted  to 
enginemeh  in  1910. 

In  this  case  the  crew  in  charge  of  the  wreck  train,  composed  of  ex- 
perienced men,  did  not  avail  themselves  of  even  the  ordinary  methods 
and  safeguards  provided  by  the  railroad  company  for  the  operation 
of  trains.  No  great  emergency  existed  at  this  time,  as  the  track  had 
been  cleared  for  the  passage  of  trains  and  all  that  remained  to  be 
done  was  to  pick  up  two  cars  lying  beside  the  track.  And  when  men 
in  charge  of  a  train  resort  to  such  ill-advised  and  haphazard  practices 
as  were  followed  in  this  instance,  accidents  of  this  kind  may  be  ex- 
it: i  ted  to  occur. 

Respectfully  submitted. 

H.  W.  Belnaf, 
Chief  Division  of  Safety. 

WASHINGTON  j  GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE  :  1917 


